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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in not strictly construing the ambiguity in the 
indemnification agreement against the drafter of the agreement. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in not strictly construing the ambiguity in the 
indemnification agreement against Western Surety, who was a surety for hire. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in not ruling that the contract ended when appellant 
withdrew from the business. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is an action by a financing institution against an automobile dealership, its 
owner, and its bonding company to recover a loss incurred by the financing company 
concerning an automobile sale. The surety filed a third party complaint against the 
appellant for indemnification for any loss the surety company might sustain on the bond. 
The first party complaint was settled before trial and the third party complaint regarding the 
validity of the indemnity agreement was heard on May 7, 1987 before the Honorable 
Boyd L. Park. The court rendered judgment against third parly defendant and in favor of 
the surety company. It is from that judgment that third party defendant appeals. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 1, 1978, Western Surety issued a Motor Vehicle Bond to Herf s 
Heritage Motors Inc. (See Bond). 
Joe Ollivier was one of the names signed on the bond as an indemnitor but Mr. 
Ollivier has no recollection of signing the application for the bond but does admit that it 
looks somewhat like his signature. (Trans, p. 104). 
Mr. Ollivier does not believe that he signed the document (Trans, pp. 109-112). 
The court found that Joe Ollivier did indeed sign the application for Bond (Trans, p. 135). 
The Bond contained no language concerning the procedure one must follow to 
withdraw as an indemnitor. (Trans, p. 136). 
The Judge found that the indemnity agreement was still in force and that Mr. 
Ollivier because of his business knowledge should have known that he had to give notice to 
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Western Surety to withdraw, even though the application for Bond was silent on that point. 
(Trans, pp. 136, 137). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In 1978, third-party defendant Joseph F. Ollivier, signed a dealer indemnity bond 
on behalf of Heritage Motors and Western Surety. At the time, Mr. Ollivier was a minority 
interest owner in Heritage Motors. The indemnity bond did not contain any instructions as 
to the duration of the agreement or to the terms of its termination. Three years prior to 
Heritage Motors bringing suit against Mr. Ollivier and Allstate Enterprises, Inc., Mr. 
Ollivier had sold any and all interest he had in Heritage Motors. Mr. Ollivier, who had no 
memory of signing the indemnity agreement, did not notify Western Surety of the 
termination of his business interest with Heritage Motors. 
This Court has long held, as has a majority of courts, that the terms of an 
ambiguous agreement are to be construed against the drafter of the agreement. Any 
ambiguity in the agreement, has in this Court and the majority courts, been resolved in 
favor of the non-drafting party to the agreement. This Court has further held that a contract 
for a surety for hire should be strictly construed against the surety. These notions are well 
settled and set forth good law for which third-party defendant, Joseph F. Ollivier, herein 
relies. A correct application of these notions to our present fact situation absolves Mr. 
Ollivier of the adverse judgment from the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION OF A CONTRACT 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE PARTY WHO HAS DRAFTED THE 
AGREEMENT. 
The well established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction 
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of a contract should be resolved against the party who has drawn the agreement. Sears v. 
Riemerssman. 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982), Matter of Estate of Orris, 622 P.2d 337 (Utah 
1980), Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), Skousen v. 
Smith. 493 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1972). The signed dealer indemnity bond in our present case 
was uncertain in regard to its duration and terms of termination. 
The trial court in its findings at the end of the trial stated: 
. . .the only thing that really bothers me a little bit in here is that 
normally in these areas where there is ripe for one to escape where you [are] 
indemnitor, there is language which says that you are an indemnitor only 
until such point and time as you say that you no longer want to be an 
indemnitor and you withdraw that indemnity. That language is not 
contained in this particular agreement, that bothers me, that is my most 
difficult hurdle to get over. However, in view of the education of Mr. 
Ollivier and in view of his business experience I am going to have to decide 
that [in] favor of the bonding company Western Surety. Trans, p. 136, 137 
It is clear from this passage that the trial judge construed the ambiguity in the contract 
against Joe Ollivier and not against the drafter Western Surety; this is directly in opposition 
to current Utah case law. 
The respondent, Western Surety, holds the control over this situation. They drafted 
the agreement and were responsible for the language that was contained in the contract. 
They had the power to set the rules and it is against public policy and existing case law to 
punish Joe Ollivier for their poorly drafted contract. According to the trial court's 
interpretation of the agreement in question, Mr. Ollivier would have been liable to Western 
Surety indefinitely. In order to impose this type of far-reaching liability in favor of 
Western Surety the law should require clear notice and intent to Mr. Ollivier. In this case 
the contract was silent as to the length of the obligation, and also the procedure for 
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terminating the contract, therefore the contract should be construed against the drafter and 
in favor of Mr. Ollivier. 
POINT II 
WHERE A CONTRACT IS SILENT AND THE PARTIES' INTENT CANNOT BE 
ASCERTAINED THE PARTIES ARE BOUND FOR A REASONABLE TIME. 
The majority rule, and the one which had been followed in those courts 
surrounding the jurisdiction of this Court, is that where a contract is silent and the parties' 
intent cannot be ascertained, and the performance has been rendered, the parties are bound 
for a reasonable time. Shultz v. Atkins, 554 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1976). To determine 
whether a contact has been performed for a reasonable time we must examine the subject 
matter of the contract, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. Tavel v. Olsson, 535 P.2d 1287 (Nev. 1975). Where the record does not 
clearly establish the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the subject matter and 
relationship of the parties is important. However, at the time that Mr. Ollivier signed the 
indemnity agreement, he held a part interest in the business associated with the bond. 
Having an interest, it was only reasonable that he too would have some liability. At the 
time that the claim of the indemnity arose, Mr. Ollivier's relationship to the parties had 
changed; Mr. Ollivier had severed all ties with the business three years prior to the incidents 
surrounding the claim in this lawsuit. The bond and indemnity agreement which had to 
renewed yearly should not have been applicable to Mr. Ollivier beyond the last year that 
Mr. Ollivier maintained any relationship to the business. 
Considering the circumstances surrounding this contract, it is logical and reasonable to rule 
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that Mr. Ollivier's contract for indemnity ended at the end of the year he withdrew from any 
ownership interest in the business. 
The trial court in this case, by its ruling, imposed a duty as a matter of law on Joe 
Ollivier to notify Western Surety of his withdrawal from the business. It is Joe Ollivier's 
position that any obligation of notice should be imposed by contract between the parties and 
not as a matter of law; the reason being that Joe Ollivier was unaware of a duty to notify 
the surety company and there was no way for him to have been aware of that duty absent 
the plain language of the contract. 
Western Surety argued at trial and the trial judge seemed to agree (See Trans, 
p. 136) that a Surety Company shouldn't have to require annual checks on their 
indemnitors. Joe Ollivier strongly disagrees and proposes that at the very least the Surety 
Company must make it clear by their contract what the indemnitors duties and liabilities are. 
In fact, Kent Blackley, an agent of Western Surety testified that some companies require a 
new financial statement every two or three years in order to check on their indemnitors 
(Trans, p. 58). 
It is appellant's position that a surety company must control its procedures through 
clear contractual language or if the contract is ambiguous, such as in this case, it is the 
surety company's duty to discover any change of circumstances beyond the one year period 
of the initial premium. It is clear in this case that to impose a duty on appellant for 
indemnity, three years after he withdrew from any interest in the business and seven years 
after he allegedly signed the application for bond, is unreasonable and contrary to case law. 
-5-
POINT III 
A CONTRACT OF A SURETY FOR HIRE IS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE SURETY 
To aid in the interpretation of the meaning, force and effect of the language of this 
bond, appellant appeals to a rule of construction set forth by this Court: "Our own court is 
committed to rule that the contract of a surety, for hire, is to be strictly construed against the 
surety." Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile G.M.C Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557 at 560 (Ut. 
1983). 
This Dillon case concerned an action by an injured party against the bond and did 
not involve the indemnitor as in this case. However, the reasoning and logic are the same. 
The bonding company is paid a premium to act as a surety for the people who deal with the 
automobile dealership. Inherent in this relationship is a certain amount of risk on the part 
of the surety. In order to take that risk the surety requires the payment of a fee. The surety 
company can minimize their risk by controlling many variables including but not limited to, 
the language of the contract, accepting or rejecting the risk, the rate of the premium and 
selection of the indemnitors. Because the surety controls all these factors, the courts have 
strictly construed the contracts against the sureties. 
In this case Western Surety controlled the circumstances surrounding the contract. 
Joe Ollivier was unaware of any procedure he must follow to withdraw from the idemnity 
relationship. Western Surety, who controlled the drafting of the documents and received a 
premium for its service, should at the very least be required, as part of the contract, to 
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clearly spell out the obligations and liabilities of the parties. To construe this agreement any 
other way then against the surety company is clearly against existing Utah case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The case law in this jurisdiction is clear regarding the two important issues in this 
case. First, that a contract, if ambiguous, should be construed against the drafter of the 
agreement; and second that a contract for a surety for hire is to be stricdy construed against 
the surety. In the present case, Western Surety is both a surety for hire and the drafter of 
the agreement in question and therefore any ambiguity in the agreement should be strictly 
construed against them. Despite this clear case law the trial court construed the ambiguity 
against Mr. Ollivier and in favor of Western Surety. Consequently, the trial court has erred 
as a matter of law and this court should respectfully reverse the lower court. 
DATED this day of November, 1987. 
YOUNG & KESTER 
ALLEN K. YOUNG 
Attorney for Appellant J. F. Ollivier 
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ADDENDUM 
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2. Transcript p. 104 
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Additionally there was , Zions led me to believe that 
when Mr. Heriford started having some trouble with the 
company that I was also responsible for loans that Zions 
had made to cars that had been sold from Heritage Motors 
that were possibly not to be covered by a reserve amount. 
They pursued that for over a year until I finally asked for 
the actual documents because I did not believe I had 
signed anything like that and they finally admitted to 
me that in reality that I had not signed. But they tried 
very diligently to get me to come and collateralize 
some insecured loans that they had. 
Q Now they communicated with you annually or more 
often the bank? 
A I had to have a new financial statement once a year 
to them. 
Q And that is the way you dealt with them? 
A And I knew the banker and Bill dealt with him as 
he came around to inspect the cars once a month a man 
named Dan Openshaw and I knew him. 
Q Is there anything else about that document that 
makes you believe you in fact didn't sign it the aoplicatio 
A I am careful what I sign and I do read what I sign 
and the reason that I believe that I don't remember seeing 
this or don't believe I signed it is because I would have 
read it. It calls for a' financial statement. That implies 
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right there that there must be some liability and I would 
have certainly read through and I can't remember the 
language here but if I would have signed it I would have 
read it because my liability and I would want to make 
clear to Mr. Heriford and I think he understood that it 
was limited only to the flooring line at Zions. That was 
my reason that I think I put up a small amount of money 
also but that was the reason for my interest in the 
company. 
Q You didn't hold any office with the company is that 
true? 
A No just shareholder. 
Q This statement dated October 1st what was the 
puroose of that financial statement? 
A I believe that was a statement that was given to 
the bank to obtain the flooring line. 
Q You were never asked by Mr. Heriford to prepare 
a financial statement to give to Western Surety to become 
a surety on a bond? 
MR. PLANT: Objection it is leading. 
THE COURrT It is leading objection sustained. 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
Q Did Mr. Heriford ever ask you to orovide a fmancia 
statement for any other purpose? 
A Other than the bank no. 
1 12 
in a normal eguity case. And a surety is not like a 
bank. A bank loan is an entirely different animal than 
one of a surety and an indemnification. Mr. Young has 
done a fine job of the comparison I don^t believe they 
are the same animal at all. 
I am concerned and feel some regret because of the 
circumstances and maybe some who would feel a little 
different than I would with regard to the case but 
it appears to me that I have to find that the Application 
for the Bond contains sufficient language for 
indemnification and that signatures thereto once they have 
been accepted by the surety company and a bond has been 
issued you become fixed and they are an integral part of 
the bond. 
I have to believe that it is Mr. Ollivier's signature. 
I can appreciate that he might not remember it but there is 
no evidence to the contrary that it is not his signature 
other than his lack of memory and that he doesn't think 
he would have signed such a thing because he doesn't 
think he would have signed it unless he had read it. He 
may not have read it but that would not allow him to 
escape from the terms of the application and the 
indemnification contained therein because he , if he did 
in fact sign it, and that is a finding of the court that he 
did sign it. 
135 
This is an integral part of starting a business you 
cannot have an on going business in this State without 
the bond. He was interested in being a part of this 
business. He knew he was going to be the financial 
support whether he signed this in Zions Bank or wherever 
he may have signed it. 
I am a bit appalled that Mr. Heriford's memory, that he 
doesn't remember any of this but then in view of his 
present position in this situation I guess that is to be 
expected. 
I don't find that in bond applications of this sort 
where their indemnifications or bonds of this sort that 
there is an obligation upon the surety to make an annual 
check upon the insured or the people of the State of Utah 
or whoever it is that has some obligation as long as paymen 
are being made that is pretty much implicit in the 
Bonding Law. When the payments are being made on an annual 
basis you don't renew the oolicy, you don't renew the 
aoplications that is a standard procedure and the only thin 
that really bothers me a little bit in here is that normall 
in these areas where there is ripe for one to escape where 
you are indemnitor, there is language which says that you 
are an indemnitor only until such pom}: and time as you 
say that you no longer want to be an indemnitor and you 
withdraw that indemnity. That language is not contained 
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1 in this particular agreement that bothers me that is my mosjt 
2 difficult hurdle to get over. However, in view of the 
3 education of Mr. Ollivier and in view of his business 
4 experience I am going to have to decide that favor 
5 of the bonding company Western Surety. 
5 So based on that reasoning and those facts it is the 
7 Judgment of this court that Western Surjety have a Judgment 
g over against Mr. Ollivier for their amount of money that 
9 they are obligated to pay under the bond and for such 
i i 
jg costs as they have incurred and reasonable attorney 
11 fees. Reasonable attorney fees will be submitted by 
12 affidavit in accordance with our Administrative Order I 
13 think it is I am not sure 25 but I am not sure what it is. 
14 You wall submit copies to Mr. Young of those affidavits 
15 so that he can raise any objections that he feels are 
15 appropriate. 
17 Also Mr. Plant you will draw the Findings of Fact, 
18 Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter and submit 
j9 those to Mr. Young under Rule 2.9 and then to the court. 
20 Anything further? 
21 MR. PLANT: No Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: This is the first case maybe it will 
23 get a test if there is a lot of them out *-here. 
24 MR. YOUNG: Will have to Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: May very well I cart understand that. 
A I then told him that I needed tfo have the individuals 
sign this application. 
Q Did Mr. Heriford ever represent to you that Mr. 
Ollivier had read this document other than to sign it if 
in fact he did at all? 
A No what I simply did was pick up the document and 
signatures on it. 
Q Fine. Now Mr. Plant was talking toyou about the 
course of dealing once a bond is issued you are not aware 
of the fact that Mr. Ollivier terminated all of his 
interest whatever small it was in Heritage Motors not 
Herf's Heritage Motors but Heritage Motors Inc., sometime 
in 1982? 
A I had no knowledge of that. 
Q Isn't it true that the as a course of doing 
business now that the bonding companies generally every 
two or three years require new financial statements and 
to determine the stability of the comoany and the 
individuals who are guarantors? 
MR. PLANT: Did you say Western Surety or companies 
in general? 
MR. YOUNG: Surety companies in general. 
THE WITNESS: Some companies do. 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
Q N-)W you testified that to your knowledge Mr. Ollivifer 
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